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S054868
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KHALID KHAWAR,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent.

)
)

V.

)

) 2d Civil No. B084899
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
)
) Los Angeles County
Defendant and Petitioner, ) Superior Court No. WEC13985
___________________________________________ )

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989, Khalid Iqbal Khawar filed suit against
Globe International, Inc.^ in the Los Angeles County Superior Court
alleging libel per se.

(Clerk's Transcript 137.)^

A jury trial

ensued, and the jury entered a special verdict on March 25,
finding that:

1994,

(1) the article was a neutral and accurate report of

the statements made by Robert Morrow in The Senator Must Die:
Khawar was a private figure;

(2)

(3) Globe published the article

negligently by failing to learn whether the statements were false
prior to publishing;

(4) Globe published the article either

knowing that the defamatory statements were false or with reckless
disregard of whether the defamatory statements were true or false;

*
^

Herein referred to as
"
Herein referred to as "C.T.", Reporter's Transcript referred to as

1

and (5) Globe published the article with malice or oppression.
(C.T. 2780-83.)

The trial judge subsequently overruled the jury's

finding and determined that the article was in fact not a fair and
accurate report but allowed the rest of the verdict to stand.
(C.T. 2742-44.)

On April 15, 1994 the court entered judgment in

favor of Khawar against Globe in the amount of $1,175,000.
3110.)

(C.T.

Globe filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment on

June 6, 1994.

(C.T. 3125, 3130.)

After undertaking an

independent review of the record, the Court of Appeal for the
Second District affirmed the judgment on June 5,

1996.

Khawar v.

Globe IntM - Inc. . 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, review granted,
This Court granted review on September 25, 1996.

(1996).

Id^ at 92.

Sf.atement of Facts
In late 1965, a Pakistani student named Khalid Iqbal Khawar
obtained press credentials and began serving as a newspaper
reporter and photographer for Pakistani publications.
1333:25-27; 1335:18-24.)

(R.T.

Mr. Khawar started covering events

involving Senator Robert F. Kennedy in April,

1968.

(R.T. 1337:2-

5.)
On the night of June 4, 1968, Mr. Khawar went to the
Ambassador Hotel as a freelance journalist to cover Senator
Kennedy's California Primary victory announcement.
5.)

(R.T. 1337:2-

Mr. Khawar located himself near the Senator as one of 25-30

people on the victory podium during Senator Kennedy's speech.
(R.T. 1389:22-24; 1390:1-2.)

Mr. Khawar testified at trial that

2

he wanted to be close to Senator Kennedy in order to take pictures
of the event as well as to have his own picture taken with Senator
Kennedy.

{R.T. 1340:7-11.)

That night, Mr. Khawar took

photographs of Senator Kennedy, and also had a friend take
photographs of Mr. Khawar and Senator Kennedy together on the
stage.

(R.T. 1340:12-26.)

Due to Mr. Khawar's proximity to

Senator Kennedy and the extensive press coverage of the night, Mr.
Khawar testified that he was not surprised to see an occasional
photograph of himself with the Senator.
1392:1-12.)

(R.T. 1390-91:18-2;

Mr. Khawar's image was in fact seen on national

television that evening, in Time magazine the following week, on
annual television broadcasts of the Kennedy assassination footage,
and on videotape coverage of the night available to the public
through the California State Archives.
14; 1393:2-9; 710:16-20.)

(R.T. 1391:25-26; 1392:3-

In addition, Mr. Khawar retained copies

of the photographs of himself and Senator Kennedy in his house and
office and estimated that thousands of friends, employees and
other people had seen the photographs.
proud of this notoriety.

(R.T. 1359:3-12.)

He was

(R.T. 1358:18-20.)

Directly following Senator Kennedy's victory speech in the
Embassy Room, he was assassinated in the pantry area of the hotel,
located to the left of the stage.
5,

(R.T. 954:4-5.)

After the June

1968 assassination, Mr. Khawar left the United States on

November 6,
1971.

1968,

(R.T. 1351:13.)

(R.T. 1353:27.)

He later returned on May 7,

Mr. Khawar moved to Bakersfield, and he

3

evencually became a United States citizen in 1977.

(R.T.

1355:4-

6, 1370:10.)
On November 30, 1988, Roundtable Press published Robert
Morrow's book The Senator Must Die:__ The Murder of Robert F.
Kennedy.

(C.T. 140.)

In the book, Morrow outlined an

assassination theory detailing an elaborate plot between the CIA,
the Iranians, and the Mafia to kill Senator Kennedy.

(C.T. 140.)

The book featured photographs portraying Mr. Khawar standing next
to the Senator, identical in all respects except clarity to the
photograph that had appeared in Time magazine and on previous
television footage.

(R.T. 1357:20-26; 1392:3,9-23.)

Despite the

photographic identification of Mr. Khawar, Morrow referred to the
I

assassin as Ali Ahmand and not as Mr. Khawar.-

(C.T.

140.)

Shortly after the publication of Morrow's book, John
Blackburn, a reporter for Globe.
qfanar.or Must Die.

interviewed Morrow about The

(R.T. 1093:9-14.)

Mr. Blackburn wrote a news

stor/ about the book, summarizing Morrow's assassination theory as
a newsworthy event due to the intense and continuing interest in
the Kennedy assassinations.

(R.T. 1601:9-28.)

The article

contained a total of fifteen attributions to Morrow as the source
of the information in the article.

(R.T. 1596:1-13.)

Mr.

Blackburn testified that he made an effort to contact "Ali Ahmand"
through telephone directory assistance, but was unable to locate

* ”.-.li Ahmand” is actually a reference to Ali Ahmad. Mr. Khawar's
father. (R.T. 1385:17-28.)

4

him.

^R.T.

1120:23-1121:9.)

amrie on April 4,

Globe published Mr. 51ac;<burn' s

1989 and ran a photograph reproduced from the

Morrcw book that depicted Mr. Khawar standing on the podium next
CO Senator Kennedy with an additional black arrow pointing to Mr.
Khawar.

(R.T.

1357:20-28.)

Consistent with Morrow's book,

the

article identified the alleged assassin as Ali Pihmand. not Mr.
Khawar.

(C.T.

140.)

Subsequent to the publication of the book and the article,
Mr. Khawar made an appearance on the local television station,
KERO CO rebut the charges made in the book and Che Globe article.
R.T.

381:22-23,

1590:25-23.)

5

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether Respondent was a limited purpose public figure when
he voluntarily interjected himself into the public
controversies of Senator Kennedy's election and
assassination.

2.

Whether punitive damages were inappropriate in the absence of
a showing of actual malice.

3.

Whether the Globe news article about Robert Morrow's book.
The Senator Must Die. constituted a neutral and accurate
report, thereby subjecting the article to the neutral
reportage privilege.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the lower court for
three reasons.

First, Mr. Khawar was a limited purpose public

figure and, therefore, the Globe article was subject to the
protection defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its
progeny.

A voluntary limited purpose public figure is one who,

under normal circumstances,

is a private figure, but then

voluntarily injects himself into a vortex of public controversy.
Mr. Khawar qualifies as a voluntary limited purpose public figure
because he voluntarily injected himself into the vortex of public
controversy surrounding the election and assassination of Senator
Kennedy.

Mr. Khawar was a journalist who persistently followed

famous public figures and proudly displayed photographs of himself
with public figures,

thereby reaping the benefits of his actions.

Additionally, Mr. Khawar is an involuntary limited purpose public
figure because the assassination was a "major public occurrence."
Second, no actual malice was shown during the trial and
therefore, punitive damages were wrongly awarded.

A public

figure, whether general or limited purpose, must show actual
malice in order to recover punitive damages.

The standard for

actual malice in defamation cases is actual knowledge that the
statements made were false.

There was no evidence presented at

trial that Mr. Blackburn actually knew the statements were false.
Since no malice was shown, punitive damages were wrongly awarded.
In the alternative, even if Mr. Khawar were a private figure, he

7

was still involved in events of substantial public concern, mainly
the election and assassination, and, therefore, must also show
actual malice.
Finally, the nlobe article constituted a neutral and accurate
report of the theory in Morrow's book The Senator Must Die and,
accordingly, should have been protected from liability under the
neutral reportage privilege.

The neutral reportage privilege

protects accurate, newsworthy and disinterested republications,
even when such republications contain false statements.

The globe

article republished statements from Morrow's book without
concurring in or deliberately altering those statements.

The

article contained fifteen attributions to Morrow as the source of
the statements and reported on the publication of Morrow's book as
a newsworthy event in and of itself.

The picture of Mr. Khawar

which mobe ran with the article was identical in all respects
except clarity to the photographs in Morrow's book as well as the
photograph that had appeared in Time.

Therefore, when examined in

totality, the Rlobe article qualifies as a neutral, accurate and
disinterested republication, not original defamation.
Even if California has not adopted the neutral reportage
privilege, the privilege should be adopted by this Court
consistent with the Second Circuit's finding in Edwards v.
Audubon Soc'v. Inc^

Sound public policy favors the

creation of an area of protection for the republication of
defamation.

Although there is a delicate balance between the

8

individual's right to privacy and the right to free press, the
danger of quelling free speech necessitates a high level of
tolerance for publication.

The neutral reportage privilege is not

an unlimited privilege and presents a workable guideline for
protecting the free flow of newsworthy information.
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT WAS A LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE HE
VOLUNTARILY THRUST HIMSELF INTO A VORTEX OF PUBLIC
CONTROVERSY.
A.

The Standard Of Review Is De Novo.

In cases involving free speech,
reviewed de novo.

the evidence should be

S.ee New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S.

254, 285 (1964). Accordingly,

this Court should reevaluate the

trial findings through an independent review of the record.
Additionally, whether an individual is a private or public figure
should be a finding made by the trial judge because it is a mixed
question of law and fact.

See Rosenblatt v. Baer. 383 U.S. 75,

(1966); Reader’s Digest Ass'n.
244,

252

(1984).

88

Inc, v. Superior Court. 27 Cal. 3d

Because the jury, instead of the judge, decided

the issue of whether Mr. Khawar was a public or private figure,
this Court should make an independent examination and determine
the status of the plaintiff anew.
Moreover, a de novo standard of review also applies
specifically to the question of actual malice.

See Bose v.

Consumer Union of the United States. 466 U.S. 485
Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835

(1984).

9

(1984); McCov v.

This Court should,

therefore, make an independent determination of whether or not a
finding of actual malice was supported by the facts at trial.
B.

A

Roth The Future Election And Assassination Of Senatojr
Kennedy Were Public Controversies.
limited purpose public figure is one who "voluntarily

injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of
issues."

Veaod Com. v ■ ABC. Inc. , 25 Cal. 3d 763, 767

(1979) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch.
(1974)).

Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 351

The requisite public controversy can vary greatly in

what it involves, but it is generally defined as an event that
"warrants public attention."
1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 1995).

Partington v._Bugliosl>

56 F.3d

A controversy qualifies "if the issue

was being debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and
substantial ramifications for nonparticipants."
Fairchild Publications. Inc..
1980).

Waldbaum v.

627 F.2d 1287, 1297

(D.C. Cir.

It is "any topic upon which sizeable segments of society

have different, strongly held views."
Co.. Inc.■ 745 F.2d 123, 137

barman

—Flynt Distrib.

(2d Cir. 1984).

The presidential candidacy and murder of Senator Kennedy at
issue in this case meet this definition.

An election, by its

nature, sparks many "different, strongly held views."

An

election involving the brother of the slain ex-President John F.
Kennedy is certain to involve even more than usual media
attention.

Therefore, the RFK presidential campaign alone is

enough to qualify as a public controversy.

10

Furthermore, the

subsequent murder of Senator Kennedy was—and remains--a public
controversy itself.
Many limited purpose public figure cases have involved a
public controversy consisting of facts much more mundane than
those in the instant case.

A man espousing proper earthquake

safety procedures was held to be a limited purpose public figure
in Copp v. Paxton. 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 846 (1996).

Copp

involved a private figure who became public for a limited purpose
because "[t]he issue of earthquake disaster mitigation in public
schools had 'foreseeable and substantial ramifications for
nonparticipants.'"

Id.

Local politically debated horse racing

issues were a "public controversy" in Mosesian v. McClatchv
Newspapers.

233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1689-93

(1991).

The limited

purpose public figure in Mosesian had involved himself in the
local debate on horse racing.

Id.

Both of these cases involved

issues much less important to the general public than a national
presidential election.
Cases denying "public controversy" status to an event are few
and distinguishable.
Inc^, 25 Cal. 3d 763

The leading example is Veaod Corp. v. ABC.
(1979).

Francisco department store.

Veaod involved the closing of a San
That scenario is of much less

interest to the general public of San Francisco, and arguably of
no interest to the rest of the country.
public affairs or public figures.

It has nothing to do with

A presidential campaign and

assassination are of such heightened importance to the entire
nation that the two cases are incomparable.

11

c.

The Difference; Between The Campaign And The Murder _Is
Inconsecaiential Because Limited Purpose Public—Fiqure
Status Applies To ”Anv Related Defamation Action”.

Petitioner argues that since Mr. Khawar was not actually
present in the Embassy Ballroom during the murder, he did not
voluntarily thrust himself in the murder controversy.

Yet, this

Court has held that "such significant, voluntary efforts to inject
oneself into the public arena require that such a person or
organization be classified as a public figure in any related
defamation action."

Reader's Digest Ass'n^—Inc . y.^—Superior

Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 256 (1984) (emphasis added).

The campaign

was intimately linked to the murder, and Mr. Khawar was
photographed with Senator Kennedy just minutes before the murder.
(R.T. 1341:5-12.)

The fact that the killing occurred in a

different room does not mean that the campaign is not a related
action.
Mr. Khawar was constantly seeking out figures in the public
limelight to photograph and with whom to be photographed.
1335:18-28; 1336:1-18.)

(R.T.

He was a journalist active in politics,

including the 1968 presidential election.

(R.T. 1336:8-18.)

In

addition to Senator Kennedy, he covered Hubert Humphrey, George
Wallace, Vice President Nixon, and Alan Cranston.
18.)

(R.T. 1336.9-

He then published these articles in Pakistan under his name.

(R.T. 136:16-27.)

These were all significant efforts to involve

himself in the public arena.

These efforts make him a limited

purpose public figure for the assassination, which,

in addition to

being closely related to the presidential election, was a direct
consequence of it.
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D.

Respondent Thrust Himself Into The Public Controversy.

The category of limited purpose public figure has been
defined by this Court as encompassing individuals who, under
normal circumstances, have not achieved enough fame such that they
would always be considered a public figure.
Ass'n,

Reader’s Digest

Inc, v. Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 253

(1984).

This

Court defined the limited purpose public figure as one who
"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues."

Id.

(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch.

U.S. 323, 351 (1974)(emphasis added)).

Inc.. 418

Courts must focus on

affirmative actions and the "nature and extent of an individual's
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
defamation."

Id,, at 254

Inc.. 443 U.S. 157, 167

(citing Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass'n.
(1979)).

This case involves a journalist who pursued Senator Kennedy
and was consequently identified with the events he had sought to
become a part of.

Mr. Khawar took numerous affirmative steps in

order to inject himself into the vortex of both public
controversies at issue.

He arrived early the night of the

assassination so he could climb onto the podium and have his
picture taken with the new Presidential Candidate Robert Kennedy.
(R.T. 1339:23-27; 1340:10-11.)

He was on that podium both before

and after Senator Kennedy arrived.

(R.T. 1348:11-23.)

He

published his pictures of the election and murder in Pakistan.
(R.T. 1350:26-27.)

He enjoyed displaying the picture of himself

and Senator Kennedy in his office.
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(R.T. 1357:18-23.)

He was

proud of being pictured with political leaders.
20 )

(R.T. 1358:18-

He let thousands of people see these pictures displayed in

his office.

(R.T. 1359:1-5.)

He was even pictured on the cover

of Time magazine published the week following the murder, and then
purchased and kept a copy.

(R.T. 1392:3-18.)

Mr. Khawar is

thereby differentiated from the innocent victim who was "dragged
xanwillingly into the controversy."

Wplstoii/ 443 U.S. at 166.

Cases where the actions of the private figure were
insufficient to create public figure status are distinguished by
the absence of almost any voluntary acts.

In Wolston,

for

example, the Court held that Wolston was "dragged unwillingly into
the controversy."

Id. at 166.

This is much different than Mr.

Khawar's affirmative and voluntary actions of continuously seeking
to photograph Senator Kennedy.

A socialite was defamed in Time,

Tnc. V- Firestone. 424 U.S. 448 (1976) .

Wealth and social

activity were insufficient to make the plaintiff a public figure.
Id. at 455.

Again, Mr. Khawar was not merely conducting his life

in an ordinary fashion as was the case in Firestone.

Mr. Khawar s

affirmative pursuit of popular figures differentiates him from a
mere socialite.

An ordinary contractor was accused of performing

shoddy work in Brown v. Kelly Broad. Cq_^ , 48 Cal. 3d 711 (1989) .
That contractor had not done anything that an ordinary, private
contractor would not do.

Id■_ at 750.

Performing contracting

duties for an average clientele is distinguishable from
photographing and pursuing presidential candidates.

The

affirmative actions of Mr. Khawar therefore are distinct from
Brown.
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E.

A Lapse Of Time Does Not Invalidate Limited Purpose
Public Figure Status.

The fact that a number of years lapsed between Mr. Khawar’s
action and the article published by Globe is irrelevant to Mr.
Khawar's status.

"Public figure status, once achieved, does not

end spontaneously with the stopping of the publicity."
233 Cal. App. 3d at 1703.

The Supreme Court has specifically

declined to rule on this issue.
Ass’n.

Mosesian.

See Wolston v. Reader's Digest

Inc.. 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979).

However,

"it appears that

every court of appeals that has specifically decided this question
has concluded that the passage of time does not alter an
individual's status as a limited purpose public figure."
Partington v. Bualiosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152

(1995).'*

Therefore,

whatever Mr. Khawar may have been doing at the time of the
article's publication is irrelevant in regard to his status as a
limited purpose public figure in this case.
Cases involving a lapse of time that has caused revocation of
the public figure status are distinguishable from the case at bar.
This Court held that limited purpose public figures do not remain
public if the controversy no longer draws any public attention.
Briscoe v. Reader ■ .q Digest Ass'n.

Inc.. 4 Cal. 3d 529,

Briscoe is distinguishable for three reasons.

First,

540

(1971).

the case

involved an actual criminal who had been convicted of a crime
eleven years before the defamatory article was published.
532-33.

Id. at

The Court reasoned that the criminal should not continue

■* See ■ e. g. . Street v. National Broad. Co.. 645 F.2d 1227, 1235 (6th
Cir. 1981); Brewer v. Memphis Publ'q. Co.. Inc.. 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th Cir.
1980); Time. Inc, v. Johnston. 448 F.2d 378, 380-382 (4th Cir. 1971).
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to be persecuted for a crime committed so long before.
Cal. 3d at 542.

Briscoe, 4

Second, the article made no mention of when the

crime occurred.

at 533.

The case at bar is distinguished

because it was clear in Globe' s article that the events were not
current.

Third, the public figure status in Briscoe would wane

only because public attention to the controversy had waned.
at 540.

Id.

Senator Kennedy's murder, however, has received constant

attention; in fact, another book referring to Mr. Khawar's name
was published in 1991.
F.

(R.T. 1409:7-15.)

Media Access Is Wot Part Of The Standard For Limited
Puroosp Public Figures. And Even If It Were.,_Respondent
Had Sufficient Media Access.

One factor that can separate public from private figures is
"effective opportunities for rebutting [defamatory] statements."
Mosesian v. McClatchv. 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1694

(1991).

The

Mosesian court did not hold that media access was a prerequisite
to public figure status.

Neither did this Court in Vegod Coyp-—v_^

ABC. Inc.. 25 Cal. 3d 763, 768 (1979).

Veaod involved the closing

down of a San Francisco department store.

Id. at 765.

The

plaintiff in that case had not discussed the close-out with the
media.

Id. at 768.

That fact, however, was only one among many

that lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not taken any
voluntary acts.

Id.

Respondent, in the instant case, did engage in independent
substantial voluntary acts and also enjoyed media access.

He met

with the president of Pakistan in 1984 because of his suposed
"very prominent" status in America.
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(R.T. 1411:18-28;

1412:1-12.)

He then gave an interview to a television station to discuss the
book.

(R.T. 1398:3-7.)
Moreover, there is no evidence that he tried to defend

himself and was unable to do so because of his private figure
status.

Given the justification for the media access argument

(that private figures are disadvantaged by a lack of media
access), any indication that Mr. Khawar desperately tried, and
failed, to counter the accusations against him is glaringly
lacking.

Within two months of reading Mr. Morrow's book, Mr.

Khawar was able to refute the charges on television.

(R.T.

1397:28, 1398:1-2.)
G.

Even Absent A Voluntary Act. Respondent Is An
Involuntary Limited Purpose Public Figure.

The designation of involuntary limited purpose public figure
has been neither adopted nor rejected in California.

An

involuntary limited purpose public figure is one who, through no
purposeful action, becomes a public figure because he becomes
embroiled in a public controversy or affair.
Welch.

Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).

See Gertz v. Robert

Although the Court said

that instances will be rare in which an individual becomes a
public figure, some courts have adopted the status.
An air-traffic controller who witnessed a well-known air
disaster became an involuntary limited purpose public figure in
Dameron v. Washington Magazine. Inc.. 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir.
1985).

Dameron could not "fairly be said to have 'injected'

himself into the controversy.
a tragedy occur on his watch."

.

.

[he] had the misfortune to have

Id.
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The Dameron court reasoned

that, despite the lack of a voluntary act,

"[i]njection is not the

only means by which public-figure status is achieved.

Persons can

be involved in public controversies and affairs without their
consent or will."

Dameron. 779 F.2d at 741.

The air disaster

involving Dameron was "a major public occurrence."
Dameron then became public "through sheer bad luck."

at 737.
Xd-

742.

The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin also affirmed an
involuntary limited purpose public figure finding in pay View
Packing Co. v. Wolfe. 543 N.W.2d 522, 533-34 (Wis. 1995).

Bay

View Packing involved a company who pickled food items and was
then accused by the defendants of having used tainted local water
in their products.

Id. at 524-27.

Although the £.ay Vi^w Packing

court recognized that it was through "sheer bad luck" and not
actions, the plaintiffs were nevertheless involuntary limited
purpose public figures.

Id. at 533-34.

An important component of involuntary limited purpose public
figure status is whether or not the public controversy existed at
the time of the alleged defamation.
F.Supp. 1404, 1410 (Ill. 1992).

Grossman v_._Smart, 807

In Grossman, the defamation

involved statements made imputing unfitness and want of integrity
with respect to the employment duties of the plaintiff.
1406.

The only undisputed voluntary act in Grossman was the

plaintiff’s application for employment with a University.
1409.

Id_s_ at

The reason that they did not find involuntary limited

purpose public figure status was because there was no evidence of
a public controversy in existence at the time that the dispute
arose.

Id. at 1410.

That evinces an important factor that can
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separate voluntary from involuntary limited purpose public
figures.
Mr. Khawar is one of the rare individuals who would be an
involuntary limited purpose public figure even if he had not
engaged in any voluntary acts.

He had the "sheer bad luck" to be

present and in the limelight on the night when Senator Kennedy was
killed.

The public controversy in question occurred twenty years

before the article and continues today and was thus in place
during the alleged defamation, thereby distinguishing this case
from Grossman.

Additionally, the public controversy of the murder

is of such enormous proportions that it in fact transcends the
"major public occurrence" air disaster at issue in Dameron.
This Court should,

in the absence of declaring Mr. Khawar a

voluntary limited purpose public figure,

find that he was an

involuntary limited purpose public figure.

He was involved in the

public controversy from its inception through the Time article.
(R.T. 1392:3-18.)
in the issue.

Regardless of his own will, he became embroiled

Other courts have found involuntary limited purpose

public figure status in similar situations, and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts also considers public concern as invoking a
priviledge.
be reported.

An event of such meaning as the RFK murder needs to
Media access to proper reporting would be

unacceptably curtailed if they could not report on the stories
' "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other ... if the matter publicized is
of a kind that . . . (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." Restat.
2d Torts § 652D (emphasis added).
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involving the relevant players in conspiracy theories questioning
government involvement.
II.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE WRONGLY AWARDED BECAUSE NO ACTUAL
MALICE WAS SHOWN DURING THE TRIAL.
A.

The Trial Sbnwed No High Dearee of Awareness of prob^blg
falsity of the Article's Allegations.

In order to award punitive damages in a defamation suit,
there must be facts supporting a finding of "actual malice.
Amant y. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).

St^

"Actual malice" can

be shown by sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publication.

Examples of evidence of these serious

doubts are "where a story is fabricated by the defendant,

is the

product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified
anonymous phone call."

Id. at 732.

This Court distinguished

"actual malice" from "constitutional malice" by its "greater
burden in obtaining redress."
3d 711, 745 (1989) (in bank) .

Brown v. Kelly Broad- Co.. 48 Cal.
This Court has also held that the

evidentiary standard must be met by clear and convincing evidence.
See Reader's Digest Ass'n- Inc. V_^—Superigy

37 Cal. 3d 244,

252 (1984) (quoting Brewer v■ Memphis Publ*q CP• ,—^26 F.2d
1238, 1258 (5th Cir. 1980)).
There was no clear and convincing evidence presented at trial
that Mr. Blackburn in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his article in the Glo.b£.

The publication was not

fabricated by him nor based wholly on an unverified anonymous
phone call.

Mr. Blackburn read Mr. Morrow’s book, which itself is
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replete with footnotes and exhibits.
1101:24-25.)

(R.T. 1093:15-17; R.T.

He interviewed Mr. Morrow before writing the story.

(R.T. 1092:15.)

Another book had been published in 1991 that told

the same scenario as Mr. Morrow's book.

(R.T. 1409:7-15.)

The

fact that he could not find Mr. Khawar to be interviewed (R.T.
1121:3-4) does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
in fact had serious doubts about the truth of the article.

There

is no evidence to indicate that he did harbor such doubts, and the
clear and convincing evidence standard precludes the Court from
merely inferring that doubts were present.^
B.

The Traditional Recklessness Standard Is Insufficient
For The Award Of Punitive Damages.

There exists no lesser standard for the awarding of punitive
damages than the actual malice discussed above.
Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 731-32

(1968).

See St. Amant v.

The recklessness component

to actual malice is only a rephrasing of malice and not a separate
standard that can be met by anything less than the malice
standard.

Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d

244, 256-57

(1984).

It is "publishing with such doubts [those of

actual malice] shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice."
3d 711, 722
731 (1968)).

Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.. 48 Cal.

(1989) fquoting St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727,
In order for Globe to have been reckless to a

*' The jury received instructions under BAJI No. 2.22.
Because
Blackburn could not recall if he had contacted Respondent and others while
they testified that he had not, they were permitted to reject Blackburn's
entire testimony. Rejection of Blackburn’s testimony, however, does not lead
to clear and convincing evidence of Blackburn's alleged doubts about
truthfulness. Khalid Khawar v. Globe Int’l Inc.. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 106
(1996) .
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unitive degree, therefore, there would still need to exist clear
and convincing evidence that Blackburn harbored serious doubts
about the truth of his article.

The record does not reflect any

evidence of such doubts.
Tf RpQnondent Ts A Private Figure, The Dgf^mation
inrludes Private figures.

■

The constitutional privilege defined in Ngw Yprk Times
includes defamation relating to private figures where the
statements concerned matters of "general or public interest. "

V.
opinion).

Inc.^- 403 U.S. 29, 32

(1971) (plurality

Although the Gertz Court somewhat limited this

protection for completely private figures, the Court has continued
to recognize a more stringent standard than recklessness for
defamation of private figures.

The Court affirmed a lower than

"actual malice" standard in Dun & Bradstreet;,
Inc.. 472 U.S. 749, 751-52

Ing. v. Greenmoss.

(1985)(plurality opinion).

That case, however, is readily distinguishable as there was
absolutely no public concern in the defamation involved.

For

private figures, the Court has held that the states have relative
freedom to establish the appropriate standard of liability for
defamatory publication as long as they do no implement strict
liability.

.See Gertz v. Robert Welch.—Inc. , 418 U.S. 323,

347

(1974) .
In accordance with Gertz, the Supreme Court has also held
that when the speech involves a public issue, a private figure
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must surmount a much higher barrier when recovering damages.
Philadelphia^Newspapers.

Inc v. Hepps. 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) .

The status of the plaintiff is not the focus; rather the court
must determine if the speech involved a public issue.

Id.

The assassination of Senator Kennedy is a matter of public
issue.

It has attracted, and continues to attract, an inordinate

amount of attention.

Conspiracy theories have been rampant about

the murder of both Kennedy brothers, and various media sources
have publicized these.

Even if Mr. Khawar himself could be

classified as a private figure, the assassination has reached such
a status that the malice standard must go beyond that for the
normal private figure.
III. GLOBE SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE NEUTRAL
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE IT SHIELDS ACCURATE,
DISINTERESTED AND NEWSWORTHY REPORTING FROM DEFAMATION
ACTIONS.
As a neutral, disinterested and accurate republication of
defamation, the Globe article at issue should be protected from
liability.

The common law defamation cause of action provides

that a republisher of defamation is as liable as the original
publisher, absent a nearly insurmountable defense of truth.
Gill v. Hughes. 227 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 1309 (1991);
2d Torts § 578.

See

also Rest.

The combination of the republication doctrine and

the truth defense deters free publication because publishers are
subjected to the possibility of costly defamation actions.
New

York

Times. 376 U.S. at 279.

See

This inherent deterrence of free
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speech in defamation laws led the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
to adopt the "neutral reportage" privilege to provide a cushion
from liability for neutral and accurate republications.
Edwards

v. National Audubon Soc'v.

556 F.2d 113

SS®

(2d Cir.

1977)
The Edwards court found that a publication is granted
immunity from liability where a reporter accurately,
disinterestedly, and in good faith republishes defamation, even
when there are "serious doubts" regarding the truth of the
statements involved.

at 120.

The Edward^ case involved a Ngw

York Times article that reported defamatory statements made
originally against DDT research scientists by members of the
National Audubon Society.

Id^ at 113.

The court recognized the

important public interest in the controversy and reasoned that the
accusations were newsworthy simply because they had been uttered.
Id. at 120.

’ Respondent contends that the neutral reportage privilege lies in a
vacuum and is not supported by precedent or Supreme Court authority.
In fact,
the Edwards court relied on previous decisions that recognized an analogous
privilege although the term "neutral reportage privilege" was not coined until
Edwards.
See Oliver v. Village Voice. Inc.. 417 F.Supp 235, 238 {S.D.N.Y.
1976)(holding that republished allegations of CIA involvement made by a person
with prominent involvement in Watergate constituted a legitimate news story);
.r Time. Inc. ■ 439 F.2d 1129 (1st Cir. 1971) (upholding summary :udgment
since Time did not assert the statements published were true and the
republication was accurate); and ge? fjgvgl y.
338 F.Supp 977, 982-83
(N.D.Ill. 1971)(granting summary judgment appropriate where publication
consisted of an accurate report of defamatory statements made by a principal
figure in sensational investigation of the JFK assassination).
Several Supreme Court cases pre-dating Edwards also imply the existence
of a limited reporting privilege. £££ Coy; Prp^d- Co.. V- Cpbn, 420 U.S. 1469,
1491 (1975)(recognizing a limited privilege for publications involving public
records); Time. Inc, v. Firestone. 424 U.S. 448. 457 (1976) (extending the
record privilege to defamation actions);
v401 U.S. 279
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The central issue in Edwards is that defamation actions
threaten the freedom of the press guaranteed in the First
Amendment.

See Edwards,

556 F.2d at 113.

The First Amendment

protects the free flow of information and the public debate of
issues that is central to American democracy.

See

Edwards. 556

F.2d at 122; see also New York Times. Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S.
254, 270-71 (1964)(recognizing a "background of profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").

Making publishers liable

for the publication of defamation presents a serious deterrent to
free speech because costly defamation suits lead publications to
stop publishing information that may be important to public
debate.

See New York Times. 376 U.S. at 279.

Neutral and

accurate republications of defamation are therefore, shielded from
liability under the neutral reportage privilege.

See Edwards.

556

F.2d at 120.
Although this Court has never had the occasion to adopt the
privilege,

the neutral reportage privilege has been adopted by a

number of state and federal courts.®

Some courts and scholars have

(1971)(protecting a republication of allegations from a Civil Right Commission
Report from defamation despite alterations and ommissions in the report).
® In addition to the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit adopted the
privilege,
Price v. Vi)cinQ Penguin. Inc.. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989).
The Third Circuit has equivocated by refusing to adopt the privilege in dicta.
£££ Dickey v. CBS. Inc.. 583 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1980); iail see
Medico v. Time. Inc.. 643 F.2d 134, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981)(noting a federal
trend towards adoption of the privilege and that therefore the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court might also be persuaded to also adopt the privilege). The Ninth
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have not yet addressed the adoption of the
privilege since numerous defamation cases were disposed of without reaching
the constitutional issue.
See White v. Fraternal Order of Police. 707
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criticized the inexact standards established in Edwards, but as
subsequent decisions have illustrated, the touchstone of the
neutral reportage privilege is the accuracy of the reporting.
Inc.. 584 F.Supp 1110, 1125

(N.D.Cal. 1984); aM

Tnf 1. Ltd,., 733 F.Supp 83, 84
1990) .

See

(C.D.Cal.

The neutral, disinterested, and accurate nature of a

report should protect the republication of defamatory statements
from liability.

£ge Edw4rd.s, 556 F.2d at 120.

Respondent contends that the Supreme Court's public/private
figure standard for defamation actions established in Qertz v.
ch

Tnc. . 418 U.S. 323

(1974) conflicts with the Edwards

standard based on the "newsworthy" status of the defamatory
statements involved.

This contention lac)ts merit.

As established

in section II.C. above, the Supreme Court has recognized in postnertz decisions that the public/private figure distinction for
defamation actions is not dispositive.

See Philadelphia

N^w^neners. Inc. V. Henns, 475 U.S. 767, 774-75

(1986).

Thus,

the

neutral reportage doctrine is not inconsistent with Supreme Court
authority.

See Barry v. TjTtie. Inc. , 584 F.Supp 1110,

1124

(N.D.Cal. 1984) (holding the court was not persuaded that any
“Supreme Court authority preclude[d] adoption of the
privilege")(emphasis added).
F.Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989){declining to address the neutral reportage privilege
because case resolved via the common law privilege) .
^ .c,
^
„
t j
For state courts adopting the privilege
April V-i—ggtor Hera
Inc. . 546 N.E.2d. 466 {Ohio 1988);
V.
*368 So. 2d 512
{FI. Ct. App. 1985).
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A.

California Should Adopt The Neutral Reportage Privilege.

California is a state that has long-honored protections of
the freedom of the press.
3d 652,

658 (1975).

See Wilson v. Superior Court. 13 Cal.

In a corollary provision to the First

Amendment, the California Constitution provides:

''[e]very person

may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right."
Const, art. I,

§ 2.

Cal.

The California Constitution thus grants

broader freedom to the press than does the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.

See Wilson.

13 Cal. 3d at 680.

California has a long-recognized publication privilege for
fair report involving public officials as well.
Code §§ 47(3)-(4).

See Cal. Civ.

Following the Supreme Court's lead in New York

Times, California Courts of Appeal have also recognized the
superiority of free speech principles over both private and public
figure plaintiffs where there is no malice and the speech is of
public concern.

See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland. 47 Cal. App.

4th 364, 377 (1996); see also Rollenhaaen v. City of Orange.

116

Cal. App. 3d 414, 420 (1981).
Moreover, California courts have recognized the neutral
reportage doctrine by analogy in three cases.

Although these

cases have not specifically presented the opportunity to address
the adoption of the privilege,
authority.

the privilege has been cited with

Stockton Newspapers.

Cal. App. 3d 966,

976

Inc, v. .Sunerior Court. 206

(1988)(resolving the issue under Civil Code
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§ 47(4)-- which protects reports involving officials in public
office--and, therefore, not deciding the constitutional
privilege); accord Grillo v. Smith,

144 Cal. App. 3d 868,

872

(1980) ; and see Weinaarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129,
(1980) (citing Edwards. 556 F.2d at 120 with approval) .
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These

developments support the contention that California has recognized
and honored the concepts underlying the neutral reportage
privilege.
Federal District courts in California have also adopted the
neutral reportage privilege.

See Barry v. Tim^—Inc_^,

584 F.Supp

1110 (N.D.Cal. 1984) (involving a defamation suit by a former USF
basketball coach against Sports Illustrated for publishing two
articles detailing an athlete's allegations of NCAA recruiting
violations).

The court adopted, but limited the privilege so that

it applies to neutral and accurate republications when the
plaintiff is a general or limited purpose public figure, and the
defamatory statements are made by a party to an existing
controversy.®

at 127.

Inc. ■ 733 F.Supp 83

The court in Ward v. News Grpup Int'l,

(C-D.Cal. 1990) also adopted the privilege as

determined by Barrv and found that the plaintiff was a public
figure, the parties making defamatory statements were parties to
the action, and "most importantly for First Amendment purposes,

" Not all courts have held that the
figures. See T.^v-in ... MrPhee. 917 F.Supp
189 (1997) (applying the privilege where a
disinterested; (2) regarding a newsworthy
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privilege is limited tc public
230 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
119 F-3d
publication is (1) accurate and
controversy; (3) the statements are

the publication was done in a neutral and accurate manner."

Id.

at 84.
Respondent points to Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.. 48 Cal. 3d
711 (1989) (in bank), as a retreat from a position favoring the
adoption of the neutral reportage privilege.

In Brown, this Court

refused to adopt the proposed broad extension of the statutory
reporting privilege under Civil Code § 47(3).
at 738.
reasons.

Brown. 48 Cal. 3d

However, the Brown decision is misleading for two
First, it relied on statutory construction, whereas this

case is not similarly confined because the neutral reportage
doctrine is a common law privilege.

Since the issue of the

neutral reportage privilege was not before the court, it only
addressed a general reportage privilege in dicta.

at 423

(acknowledging that the court's decision rested on statutory
construction not public policy).
Second,

the Brown decision was based largely on an analysis

of the ancient tradition of libel law.

See Id. at 716.

Libel

suits certainly pre-dated the First Amendment and California has a
long history of strict liability for defamation.
33.

See Id. at 729-

However, the majority of cases cited in the Brown opinion

date back to the early part of the twentieth century and pre-date
New York Times.Thus, Brown cannot fairly be cited as authority

made by a responsible and prominent source; and (4) the report does not
endorse the statements).
The Brown Court examined the legislative intent of Civil Code
section 47(3), originally enacted in 1872 and found that at that time strict
liability was the norm for defamation actions.
Id. at 716. The Court
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for the proposition that California has refused to adopt the
neutral reportage privilege.
1.

Public Policy Favors Creating A Cushion For The
RepubHcation Of Defamation In Order To Protect
The Freedom Of The Press.

Although this Court has not expressly recognized the neutral
reportage doctrine, public policy favors the adoption of the
privilege.

See Comment. Constitutional Privilege to Republl.sh

Defamation. 77 Colum. L.Rev. 1266 (1977).

Contrary to

Respondent's fears, the neutral reportage privilege is not in
danger of spiraling out of control and encroaching on the privacy
interests of California citizens.

The privilege provides a

workable balance for protecting neutral and accurate
republications of defamation yet still requiring that publishers
be held liable when they "concur in" or "deliberately distort"
published statements.

See Edwards., 556 F.2d at 120.

Libel laws

have grown increasingly less stringent over time and the trend has
been to move away from strict liability towards the "actual
malice" standard.“

A person's reputation is still deserving of

protection but the public interest in encouraging free debate and
effective dissemination of ideas demands protection for neutral
and accurate republications of defamation.

Thus, California

subsequently cited numerous cases dating back to the original enactment of the
statute and found that strenuous standards for liability were consistently
upheld in California. Id. at 717, 729-33.
In the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court stated that an
overwhelming majority of courts had adopted a similar "actual malice" standard
for defamation actions,
York Times. 376 U.S. at 280.
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should follow the lead of other courts and adopt the neutral
reportage privilege.
2.

Protecting A Reoublisher Of Defamation From
Liability Provides A Defamation Plaintiff With
Adequate Recourse.

An original publisher of defamation remains liable for all
subsequent publications that the original publisher might
reasonably foresee.
(1923).

See Simeon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611,

615

A defamation plaintiff, therefore, will still have

adequate legal recourse.

Indeed,

libel suits are more

appropriately directed toward the original defamer rather than the
republisher since the republisher often times will not have
knowledge of the falsity of statements involved.

Allowing a

defamation plaintiff to recover against a republisher and original
publisher allows a windfall.

This Court has recognized that First

Amendment freedoms can be threatened by litigation itself, even in
the absence of recovery.

See

Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach.

Inc. V. Superior Court. 22 Cal. 3d 672,

685

(1978).

The multiple

levels of recovery available to defamation plaintiffs deter the
media from publishing information that may be of public interest
and therefore unnecessarily threaten the free flow of speech
protected by the First Amendment.
B.

The Globe Article Is Appropriately Protprted From
Liability For Defamation As A Neutral And Accurate
Report.

The article published by Globe was a fair an accurate report
of Robert Morrow's book. The Senator Must Die.
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The article

contained fifteen attributions to Morrow, establishing the
neutrality and accuracy of the report.

{R.T. 1596:1-13.)

Mr.

Blackburn's deposition testimony and lead sheet reflected that the
Globe article was a "news story" based on "a new theory of the
killing of Senator Kennedy" by Robert Morrow.
1093:9-10; 1126:14-15.)

(R.T. 1095:6-8;

The article was published in order to

notify the public about the publication of Morrow's book as a
newsworthy event in and of itself.

This court has recognized that

the essence of the First Amendment is the free flow of information
of public interest.

See

Wilson V- Superior Court,

13 Cal. 3d

652, 658 (1975) (holding that "in this state we have consistently
viewed with great solicitude the right to uninhibited comment on
public issues").
goal.

The speech at issue here is relevant to that

As established above in section I.B., the Kennedy

assassinations, conspiracy theories and questioning possible
government involvement in these events has been an issue of
continued public interest.

As a result, the Qlobe article is

exactly the type of publication appropriately protected by the
neutral reportage privilege and should be shielded from liability
as a neutral and accurate republication.

1.

ThP- Globe article did not concur in

oy

deliberately

alter statements from Morrow's book.
The neutral reportage privilege protects accurate and
disinterested reporting, even when the reporter has "serious
doubts" as to the truth of the statements involved. ^ Edwards,
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556 F.2d at 120.

Therefore, protection from defamation is granted

to a republisher of defamation, as long as a republisher refrains
from "espousing," "concurring," or "deliberately distorting" the
charges.

See Edwards. 556 F.2d at 120.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has continuously held that where
speech of public concern is involved, even demonstrably false
speech is protected from liability.

See Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine. Inc.. 501 U.S. 496 (1991)(holding that even deliberate
alterations are protected, unless the changes resulted in
"material alteration in the meaning"); Time.
U.S. 279

Inc, v. Pape>. 401

(1971)(holding a significant alteration in wording did

not change the meaning of the article).
The Globe article published here contained the inaccurate
statement that Ali Ahmand assassinated Robert Kennedy.
3154.)

However,

(C.T.

like Time. the Globe article was not an

"independant report" but rather an accurate report of Morrow's
assassination theory.

See Time. 401 U.S. at 285;

(R.T. 1095:6-8.)

The statements in the article were attributed to Morrow and were
not advocated by Globe as being true.

(R.T. 1596:1-13.)

Plaintiff's expert Mr. McSweeny testified that the numerous
attributions in the article made it clear that the statements
published in the Globe article came from Morrow's book.
860:26-863:18.)

(R.T.

Therefore, no "espousing" or "material alteration

in the meaning" occurred to remove the constitutional protection
granted to accurate and disinterested publications.
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2.

iTndfir thp neutral reportage privilege, different
nf writing are accorded varying amounts gf
"literary license^.

This Court has adopted the standard that all publications
must necessarily be permitted some degree of flexibility in their
choice of the proper words and phrases in reporting.

Reader s

Digest As.q'n. Inc, v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 261, 262
(1984)(holding that the magazine had "literary license" to choose
its own language because "the choice of such language, though
reflecting a misconception, does not place the speech beyond the
outer limits of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella."
(citing Time. Inc, v. Pape. 401 U.S. 279, 290-292

(1970) ) .

Accordingly, Globe's choice of language to express the ideas
of Mr. Blackburn does not affect its neutral status.

For example,

the cover of the Globe issue at hand contained the headlines "Cure
Baldness With Vodka & Alka Seltzer" and "Johnny Carson's Mad
Inventor Weds Girl of 8" in addition to the headline for Mr.
Blackburn's article.

(C.T. 3144.)

At trial, Mr McSweeny

testified that the stylistic differences allotted to varying
publications include the ability to use hyperbolic phrases and
that Globe had a constitutional right to publish Mr. Blackburn's
article.

(R.T. 845:23-846:6; 867:2-868:8.)

Furthermore,

this

Court recognized that "'there is no such thing as a false idea'"
and that sometimes factual language becomes opinion.

Bee

(Gregory

V. McDonnell Douglas Coro.. 17 Cal. 3d 596,

601 (1976) (c^ritinq

v_ Robert Walsh. Inc., 418 U.S.

(1974)).
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333, 339

As an

article conveying a theory to the public, the statements here, as
in Gregory, were "neither factual in nature nor intended to induce
the audience .
Cal. 3d at 601.

to believe they were factual."

Gregory.

17

In this vein, the Globe article constituted an

accurate communication of Morrow's theory to the public.
3.

The neutral reportage privilege contains no duty to
investigate.

The neutral reportage doctrine does not reguire a reporter or
a publisher to investigate defamatory statements prior to
publication so long as those statements are neutrally and
accurately reported.

See Edwards.

566 F.2d at 120.

Likewise,

there is no duty to publish the other side of a given controversy.
See Time,
V.

Unkow,

Inc, v. Pape. 401 U.S. 279, 290-92
38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1498-99

(1971); ^nd see Evans

(1995) (publishing the

other side of a story is not necessary); see also Gomes v. Fried.
136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 934 (1982){holding an objective picture of
events is not required); and see Bindrim v. Mifrhell. 92 Cal. App.
3d 61, 73

(1979)(holding there is no duty to investigate when the

source is reliable).
Here, Mr. Blackburn testified that he made calls to
investigate the article and attempted to get "Ali Ahmand's" side,
but he had no notes of such calls.

(R.T. 1141:3-6; 1141:6-9.)

Mr. Blaclcburn's difficulty in contacting Mr. Khawar was largely
due to the fact that Mr. Khawar identified himself as "Khalid
Iqbal" to police on the night of the Kennedy assassination and was
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misidentified as "Ali Ahmand" in Morrow's book.
C.T. 3145.)

(R.T. 1393:23-24;

Therefore, despite the failure to investigate or

publish the other side, Mr. Kirsch testified in his expert opinion
that Mr. Blackburn satisfied any investigation duty in attempting
to contact "Ali Ahmand."

(R.T. 1602:25-1603:3.)

Thus, any

failure to investigate or publish Mr. Khawar's side do not render
the Globe article ineligible for protection under the neutral
reportage privilege.
4.

”

Robert Morrow qualifies as a responsible and
nrominent source for the purpose of the neutral
reportage privilege.

The requirement that the neutral reportage privilege is

limited to "responsible or prominent organizations or individuals"
has largely been abandoned by subsequent courts that have adopted
the privilege.

See Rarrv v. Time. Inc., 584 F.Supp 1110,

1126

(N.D.Cal. 1984)(extending the privilege to all republications
regardless of the "trustworthiness of the original defamer"); see
.icn Tn rp united Press Int'l. 106 B.R. 323

(D.D.C. 1989)(holding

that limiting the privilege to prominent sources was inconsistent
with purpose of privilege).
Robert Morrow qualifies as a reputable source according to
the neutral reportage privilege.

Morrow had published several

books prior to The Senator Must Die and was known for establishing
governmental conspiracy theories.

The publication of Morrow's

book Betrayal aided in the creation of the House Select Committee
on Assassinations.

(R.T. 841:17-19.)
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Colonel Prouty, a reputable

member of the U.S. government, wrote the forward to The Senator
Must Die, lending further credence to the validity of Morrow and
his book as a reputable source.

(R.T. 1124:21-28.)

A careful examination of the facts in this case and the
totality of the article establishes that the Globe article meets
the neutral reportage requirements established by Edwards.

The

article constituted a neutral, accurate, and disinterested
republication of a newsworthy accusation made by a reliable
source. Accordingly, the Globe article is properly covered by the
neutral reportage privilege and thus should receive protection
from liability for defamation.
5.

The jury correctly found that the Globe article was
a neutral and accurate report.

Not only does the Globe article satisfy the criteria for the
neutral reportage privilege, but the jury found in their special
verdict that the article was a fair and accurate report of
Morrow's book.

(C.T. 2780-83.)

The trial judge intervened and

overruled portions of the verdict, a decision that constituted
error in three different ways.

(C.T. 2742-44.)

The correct

standard of review of the issue of neutral reportage is whether
after an independent de novo review of the entire record,
substantial evidence supports the finding.

See Weinaarten v.

Block. 102 Cal. App. 3d 129 (1980).
First,

the judge incorrectly overruled the jury's finding

that the article was a neutral and accurate report.
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See Cal. Code

of civ. Proc. § 624 (defining a special verdict as that by which
the jury finds the "conclusions of fact as established by the
evidence .

-

. and

nothing

shall remain to the Court but to draw

from them conclusions of law.") (emphasis added) .

The jury

received an instruction based on Edwards, and after being
presented with all of the evidence, determined that the

Qlohe

article was a neutral and accurate report.(C.T. 280-83.)

Like

the jury's finding in Edwards. it is "implicit" in the jury's
finding that the Globe neutrally and accurately reported elements
from Morrow's book and therefore, as the Fdwards court determined,
"a judgment against the (Globe] ,

in the face of this finding of

fact, is constitutionally impermissible."

Edwards,

556 F.2d Id^

at 120.
Second, the trial judge inappropriately undertook a fact
finding duty that was delegated to the jury in determining that
the photograph in the Globe article was altered and, therefore,
that Globe was originally liable for defamation.
15.)

The judge exceeded his function by acting as a photographic

expert regarding an issue of fact.
624.

(R.T. 2743:12-

Cal. Code of Civ. Proc.

Moreover, the issue was never raised in the pleadings,

§

the

complaint, or by Mr. Khawar's counsel during the trial and thus

Jury instruction number twenty-six required the jury to determine
that:
(1) Robert Morrow was a responsible source; (2) the plaintiff was a
public figure; (3) there was a newsworthy, public controversy regarding the
allegations of Morrow; (4) the Globe publication accurately conveyed the
charges; (5) Globe did not espouse or concur in or deliberately alter the
allegations; (6) Globe reasonably attempted to obtain plaintiff's side; and
(7) Globe reasonably made efforts to verify the charges.
(C.T. 2883.)
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the trial judge independently undertook a determination that was
both in error and prejudicial to Globe.

(R.T. 2741:2-3.)

The

judge himself admitted the uncertainty of his actions by declaring
that his determination would constitute a "nice little point on
appeal".

(R.T. 2753:4.)

In addition, a careful examination of the photograph does not
support the judge's conclusion.

Mr. Khawar testified that he

removed the picture of himself and Senator Kennedy from his office
because "the almost exactly [sic] same picture ha[d] been
published in Globe magazine."

(R.T. 1423:6-8.)

The judge

determined that the first time a recognizable photograph of Mr.
Khawar had been used was in the Globe.

(R.T. 2744:6-8.)

However,

Mr. Khawar testified that after viewing the Globe article, he
believed that not many people would recognize him.
15.)

(R.T. 1362:13-

Thus, the photograph was not sufficiently different to

constitute original defamation and the judge's fact-finding
constituted prejudicial error.
Finally,

the judge erred in examining the photograph alone

and divorced from the entire context of the whole article. See
Gorman v. Blanchard. 211 Cal. App. 2d 126 (1962)(holding that when
determining the defamatory nature of a publication, the entire
publication, not simply parts, must be examined).

Even if

determining the applicability of the neutral reportage privilege
was a question of law, the judge was required to consider the
article in its entirety in order to determine if the privilege
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applied.

The Globe article, when considered in its entirety--as

was done by the jury--constitutes a neutral, accurate, and
disinterested report properly subject to protection under the
neutral reportage privilege.
CONCLUSION
Public figures must prove actual malice to receive punitive
damages in a defamation action.

Respondent voluntarily injected

himself into a vortex of public controversy through his
perseverance in photographing and being seen with public figures,
including the late Senator Kennedy.

He is therefore a voluntary

limited purpose public figure and must show actual malice.
Alternatively, he became involved in a "major public occurrence"
and thus, through "sheer bad luck," became an involuntary limited
purpose public figure.

Because there was no evidence submitted at

the trial that Mr. Blackburn had actual knowledge that the
accusations contained in the Globe article were false, this Court
should reverse the award for punitive damages.

In addition, the

Globe article constituted a neutral and accurate report of
statements made in Morrow's book and, therefore, the article
should be protected from defamation liability under the neutral
reportage privilege.

Accordingly, California should adopt the

neutral reportage privilege.

For the foregoing reasons,

Petitioner prays this Court reverse the lower court decision.
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Respectfully submitted,

V. Marika Meis
Counsel for Petitioner
Globe International, Inc.

